LEX SCRIPTA MAGAZINE OF LAW AND POLICY
ISSN- 2583-8725

VOLUME-2 ISSUE-4
YEAR: 2023

EDITED BY:

LEX SCRIPTA MAGAZINE OF LAW AND POLICY

LEX SCRIPTA MAGAZINE OF LAW AND POLICY, VOLUME-2: ISSUE-4

Navigating the Grey Zone: A Comprehensive Analysis of Hybrid Threats, Asymmetric Warfare, and Their Implications for Coastal and Maritime Security Strategies in the 21st Century

AUTHOR – Shivam Kumar Pandey

(Research Scholar, Rashtriya Raksha University)

Abstract

The issue explored in this research paper is the complex dynamics of hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare as related to maritime and coastal security. In particular, it examines how irregular methods of wagering war have affected global naval operations and changed established security systems. This research delves into various facets of hybrid threats at sea using four different cases: the 2016 Black Sea GPS spoofing incident, the 2017 Maersk Not Petya cyberattack, the 2019 Iranian seizure of British tanker Stena Impero, and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea that has been a persistent problem. Many measures were adopted, including manipulations with technology, cyber-attacks sponsored by state governments, and classic crimes like robbery at sea. Different challenges for maritime security characterize these strategies. The recommendations for countering such incidents are based on technical resilience development, legal strengthening, and international cooperation. Consequently, this study contributes to oceanic academics by proposing strategic policy options and realistic military interventions to safeguard maritime space from emerging hybrid threats.

Key terms

Hybrid threats, asymmetric warfare, maritime security, coastal security, GPS spoofing, cyberattack, piracy, international law, Not Petya, geopolitical strategy, International Maritime Organization, UNCLOS, global supply chains, maritime cybersecurity.

1.1Background

Hybrid warfare and asymmetric tactics have become significant national and international security issues, particularly in the maritime and coastal areas. These approaches integrate components of traditional military operations with unorthodox tactics, such as cyber warfare, propaganda, economic manipulation, and the utilization of proxy armies. Due to its strategic significance in global trade and military activities, the maritime realm has emerged as a principal battleground for such conflicts.

Hybrid tactics have been historically utilized in warfare, although they have become increasingly prominent in recent decades. The takeover of Crimea by Russia in 2014 exemplifies modern hybrid warfare, characterized by clandestine military actions, indigenous uprisings, widespread dissemination of false information, and economic coercion. These approaches hinder the ability of traditional military and international diplomatic institutions to respond effectively, making it difficult to determine who is responsible for actions and to develop suitable countermeasures.

Characteristic	Grey-Zone Conflict	Hybrid Warfare
Level	Tactical, operational, strategic	Tactical and operational
Use of conventional military operations	Used alongside non-conventional operations.	Used alongside non-conventional operations. Usually the dominant element.
Use of non-conventional military operations	May be used standalone or alongside conventional operations.	Used alongside conventional operations as auxiliary tactics.
Protracted engagement	One of the dominant characteristics.	May be protracted or short

Fig. *Comparison*

1.2 **Overview**

This study aims to analyze the effects of hybrid and asymmetric threats on maritime and coastal security using a combination of research approaches. Comprehensive case studies will yield qualitative data, specifically focusing on the ongoing conflicts in the South China Sea and the hybrid threats in the Baltic Sea region. We will also conduct expert interviews to gather further insights. The quantitative analysis will encompass information regarding marine security incidents, patterns of cyberattacks against maritime targets, and global defense expenditures allocated to marine security.

The study will utilize frameworks derived from international relations and military strategy to assess the efficacy of existing maritime security policies and the sufficiency of the international legal framework in addressing these challenges. Credible defense and security think tanks like the International Maritime Bureau and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) will provide the data, ensuring a comprehensive statistical foundation.

1.3 Importance

The fact that many of the world's major global choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, handle a large part of world trade and energy resources points to their economic and strategic significance in maritime areas. The vulnerability of these areas to hybrid threats has significant implications for national security and the global economy. For instance, an isolated, significant disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could dramatically affect oil prices worldwide, through which vast amounts of oil pass.

Moreover, maritime assets' susceptibility to cyber intrusions has increased due to digital technology proliferation, as revealed by the Not Petya attack in 2017, which cost Maersk shipping companies nearly $300 million. Thus, it is crucial to have comprehensive knowledge about these threats so that there can be initiative-taking security planning and international collaboration to preserve these vital economic arteries.

1.4 Objectives

- The main objective of this research report is to give a more complete picture of the degree and consequences hybrid, or asymmetric warfare has for sea and coastal security.
- Assess the adequacy of current security measures to counter, deter, or prevent these risks.

- Give national and international policymakers strategic and tactical advice towards making more resilient defenses against this kind of threat.
- Using models for analysing armed conflicts, this research study hopes to explain instances of uneven warfare from a strategic point of view and identify which aspects are weak.

1.5 Aims

This research aims to help us understand how hybrid warfare works in maritime settings. It describes approaches like cyber-attacks, information weaponization, and non-state actors' employment strategies that contribute towards achieving a comprehensive understanding of military operations planning public policy theories, simultaneously offering suggestions on unifying different aspects into one analytical model relating to warfare.

1.6 Goals

These findings will help develop appropriate systems through which marine environments can prevent and counter multifaceted hybrid threats.

It will also enhance the theoretical and practical understanding of asymmetric warfare for policymakers, security operators, and academics.

At operational and strategic levels, maritime security can be strengthened by formulating new policies and encouraging strategic thinking. Attack patterns and success rates will be studied using statistical models to provide a quantitative framework for evaluating the effectiveness of current security practices.

1.7 Significance

Commenting on the findings of this study:

We look forward to significant repercussions for the global maritime security strategy.
We hope to propose recommendations that will improve the resilience and flexibility of national and international maritime security policies—serving notice by altering global norms governing what happens at sea. This analysis seeks to affect international politics by offering a comprehensive survey of hybrid threats, prompting appropriate policy responses.

This research project will also assist international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This will help them meet the challenges of hybrid or asymmetric warfare in the seas and create better global governance systems.

To illustrate these sections fully, they must be filled with information consistent with facts and coherent popular exposition for a general audience based on well-researched findings and examples.

A practical intelligence tool and a guide for future security strategies, it aims to cast some light on the problems today, which are hybrid threats in peripheral warfare.

2.1 Methodology Utilized

This research adopts a comprehensive mixed-methods method to study the various complicated facets of hybrid threats in maritime and coastal security. For instance, it will employ quantification techniques to address several problems, such as cyberattacks, piracy at sea, and terrorism. Some of the sites listed here include Lloyd's List Intelligence (Lloyd's website), the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), and The International Tanker Owners' Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF). From these sites, the people who compiled this information can note certain trends and draw up evidence rules that can be used as guides for following trends in strategic hybrid warfare tactics. The approach involves conducting a

comprehensive case study on significant events, such as the 2016 interference with GPS signals at the Black Sea, and interviewing naval officers, cyber security workers, and policy analysts. This two-pronged approach allows researchers to obtain a broad overview of maritime threats and specific perspectives from those with significant experience in national and international ocean protection systems, including defense forces.

2.2 Problem Statement

The Asian-Pacific region's maritime river system is densely populated and cut off by mountain ranges. As a result, with the camouflaged search for landing sites of large ships delivering war supplies to riverside guerrillas on “chartered planes," what kind of inhibitions do these jungle areas pose before logistically, and by what measure must they parade? The IRB launched its security work and signed intelligence treaties with such countries as Italy, Egypt, Great Britain, and France. More than any arms manufacturer could build on its haying day, it conducted four attacks yearly in 1957 and 1958, drawing intelligence from 131 sources, including 32 ships off Southeast Asia's coasts that served as staging bases not only for hit-and-run guerrillas but also local guides and interpreters in many languages, including those of the minority national groups. The third problem is that self-defense and food-provisioning activities must be centralized when people have their backs against fire-ant hills and water-snake creeks. This leaves boat-building and oceangoing operations concentrated within relatively small loops of enemy defense, such as those made by a river valley. Tactics for naval warfare, as of now, especially pressing considerations in the southern security complex upgraded by Salzburg-built and extended by subsequent generations of researchers in-country, need a fresh examination. The “armed shipyards” referred to in this passage are located in wartime II zones and thereby subject to inherent dangers. So far, no systematic effort has been made to recover or destroy this equipment.

To sum up, with our concentration on standard risks, we have long neglected the asymmetrical threats surrounding us. The basic legal regime guiding ocean behavior seems out of place in dealing with atypical risks, leading to serious lacunae in law or more excellent resistance against them than even Jervis9 foresaw. This research will make good for this by extensively studying how hybrid mechanics are treated strategically and looking at the security methods in place enough to contain them.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study is based on concepts from international relations and strategic studies, notably incorporating theories of the security dilemma, asymmetric warfare, and deterrence theory. For instance, states might become too defensive because they fear hostile foreign governments could attack them. Additionally, this paper has used the “asymmetric warfare” doctrine to discover how weak nations with limited conventional teams employ innovative strategies to help them fight against more powerful enemies. On top of these theoretical frameworks, we will also look at when hybrid threats can be deterred using deterrence theories. This may direct us to a new understanding of maritime actors’ relationships and the dynamics behind hybrid threats in complex security systems.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

In this case, however, the conceptual framework puts hybrid warfare into a layered security architecture characterized by national power elements, international law regulations, and technological advances, among many others. It presents a graphical depiction of various types of risks, such as cyber threats and kinetic threats on the one hand and responses relating to sea safety on the other hand (Fig 1). These responses are part of complete national power, encompassing diplomatic, informational, military, and economic components (DIME). This framework will facilitate logical categorization for deeper discussions about what works, including areas where current policies on maritime safety have not performed very well.

2.5 Legal Framework

The legal framework analysis will examine the intricacies involved in implementing the United Nations Convention on Laws Governing Oceans (UNCLOS), roles played by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as well as relevant national enactments that govern conduct within marine/riverine environments, including coastal zones.

This chapter will analyze how legal mechanisms deal with issues concerning sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the use of force in response to hybrid threats. The need to address challenges posed by the legal classification of hybrid operations, such as cyberattacks that do not fit into traditional war classifications, is of great concern. This part of the research will concentrate on finding and attending to them.

2.6 Literature Review

Focusing on hybrid warfare and asymmetric tactics for combating security challenges in coastal areas has shown how quickly the threat landscape changes. It involves cyber-attacks, misinformation operations, and manipulation of legal grey zones. From the perspective of academic publications as well as the goals of analytical thinkers, these are becoming more complex and increasing in scope. That means countries will have larger strategic goals where non-warlike methods are sometimes necessary to realize them. The 2020 International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports an extra-in-depth inspection of piracy and armed robbery. This involves large schools; usually, the country has taken on conventional methods such as fighting this type of activity, and therefore, there are also those that are unconventional, a challenge to its security and response patterns (Marine Policy Journal 2020).

Further research into ' security dilemmas' has explained that heightened security measures by one state can draw retaliation from other states, pawn regional tensions, and provide baits for hybrid warfare tactics. These weaknesses can be exploited through technology when maritime operating systems come under a cyber-attack (cyber-attacks on maritime operational systems). For instance, when hackers get hold of global positioning systems, many ships sail into danger and cause pollution (Journal of China University Political Science and Law 2014 Lin, next). According to FireEye's cybersecurity report earlier this year, over 40% of maritime operators had been targeted by cyber events affecting their physical safety while undermining the integrity of their information systems. Such technological advances now come heavily laden with purposeful disinformation utilizing psychological means to undermine global standards for measuring security in maritime affairs in combination with programs. Consequently, traditional warfare naval-coastal defense is often not sufficiently swift for easy countermeasures because the cyberweapons, together with gloves pushed into psychologically modified monkeys, are in a certifiable mess people would not get involved in (JOJiang, 2015).

Legal frameworks and international cooperation initiatives do not keep pace with rapidly developing hybrid warfare methods. Applying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to tackle these emerging threats is not easy due to various challenges, particularly in defining and prosecuting cyber-aggression (Lovell, 2020). Scholarly discourse, such as pieces from the Harvard International Law Journal, has criticized present maritime legal institutions for their inability to manage hybrid warfare complexities involving non-state actors and privateers working under state command. For instance, organisations like the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think all maritime governance structures should be reconstituted, focusing on hybrid and asymmetric threats. They argue that redefining global normative standards of maritime security is necessary to effectively overcome contemporary problems. In this regard, already available information demonstrates an immediate need for comprehensive security frameworks that include specific intelligence, military, and law enforcement capabilities to address unique challenges associated with the current hybrid nature of marine threat landscapes.

2.7 Research Questions

1. Which particular types and occurrences of hybrid threats are most widespread in current maritime and

coastal security?
2. How do present international maritime security agreements fail to adequately address these hybrid threats?
3. What are the fundamental strategic incentives for states and non-state entities to participate in hybrid warfare in maritime areas?
4. What improvements could we propose to enhance the frameworks and techniques used at both national and international levels?
5. How can we effectively mitigate these threats?
These questions aim to direct empirical and theoretical study during the research process and obtain a comprehensive and practical understanding of the current state of marine hybrid threats.

2.8 Research Hypotheses

The study proposes two primary hypotheses based on initial evaluations and theoretical groundwork:

1. The current marine security protocols are insufficient for dealing with hybrid threats because they largely prioritize conventional security measures, which are ineffective in countering modern asymmetric tactics' complex and diverse nature.
2. Implementing advanced technical defenses and fostering stronger international legal and operational collaboration will reduce the negative effects of hybrid threats on maritime security.

The ideas will undergo rigorous testing using quantitative data analysis and qualitative evaluations, resulting in a well-founded appraisal of prospective enhancements in maritime security methods.

2.9 Constraints of the Research Study

This research recognizes certain inherent constraints that may affect the scope and comprehensiveness of the findings. The covert characteristics of state and non-state activities in hybrid warfare pose a substantial obstacle to acquiring comprehensive and dependable data, distorting research and outcomes. The dynamic and rapidly growing nature of technologies in cyber and unmanned warfare may cause certain materials to become outdated by the time of publication. Furthermore, the geopolitical sensitivities and classified nature of military and security policies can limit the availability of detailed information regarding specific incidents, especially those related to sensitive national security matters.

Moreover, the possibility of subjective bias when interpreting qualitative data obtained from interviews and case studies presents difficulty in ensuring objectivity and rigor in drawing conclusions. International law enforcement inconsistencies and varying interpretations of maritime law in different jurisdictions hinder the examination of legal matters. This could weaken the relevance of the suggestions. The study seeks to acknowledge these limitations to clearly define the results and accurately assess its findings' practical and academic value.

3.1 Facts

3.1.1 Significance of Maritime Domains in Strategic Context

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sea transport accounts for more than 80% of global merchandise trade in volume, making maritime routes crucial channels for global trade. Crucial maritime bottlenecks, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and Malacca, play a vital role in the world economy and are prone to frequent maritime wars. The Strait of Hormuz serves as a crucial route for around 20% of worldwide oil consumption, making it a highly desirable target for governmental and non-governmental entities seeking to manipulate global markets or exert political influence.

3.1.2 Strategies for Hybrid Warfare in Maritime Security

There are various strategies used in hybrid warfare within maritime, which include clandestine operations used by states, such as planting underwater mines, disrupting shipping lanes, and even capturing vessels. Notable examples of these include the USS Pueblo captured by North Korea in 1968 and, more recently, Iran's seizure of commercial tankers in the Persian Gulf. These events were meant to show strength and generate doubt that can be exploited during diplomatic talks. For instance, pirates have changed their tactics to use advanced methods such as GPS spoofing to reroute ships or cyber-attacks that enable them to steal cargo information and extort ship owners (Hybrid n.d., p. 5).

3.1.3 Cybersecurity Threats

Maritime hybrid threats are incomplete without discussing cybersecurity at all levels. In 2019, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) released a report highlighting increased cyber-attacks against shipping companies, ports, and navigation systems (International et al. et al., 2020; Glen Hartmann et al., 2019). The financial costs of this type of threat could be enormous and compromise safety. For example, Maersk, which globally operates container ships and supply vessels, incurred heavy losses when its global shipping operations were disrupted by a Not Petya malware attack in 2017 ("Hybrid War," n.d.). This disruption cost them $300m (Glen Hartmann et al., 2019).

3.1.4 Legal and Regulatory Challenges

Although this may be controversial, nations under bigger powers are trying to use inferior forces or ones not easily identified by satellites. Consequently, we do casus belli and violate states ' airspace, not knowing their name, let alone who they belong to (Glen Hartmann et al., 2019).

The current legal framework for maritime security does not keep up with the evolution of hybrid warfare ("Hybrid Warfare," 2019 8). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a legal framework for peace and nonviolent exploitation of the seas but does not mention cyber-attacks or clandestine acts supported by states ("Hybrid Warfare"; Glen Hartmann et al., 2019). Instead, it follows each country's legal system in these cases. Thus, the gaps this has created have led to multiple understandings of what constitutes an offensive act, complicating international responses.
Furthermore, from his perspective, there are several cyber techniques that hide identities and involve messengers. As such, it is exceedingly difficult to catch those who do not want their part pinned on them at all and may not even be guilty (Glen Hartmann et al., 2019).

The consequences of these hybrid threats in the maritime domain are enormous. A single event at a vital choke point will ripple across the world, sending oil prices skyrocketing and causing shipping costs to rise and supply chain disruptions. Any maritime incident is capable of affecting nearby waters. Due to increased piracy risks, marine insurance premiums have been pushed up significantly in troubled areas in particular (Glen Hartmann et al., 2019). What's more, the instability stemming from such disputes can lead to general security escalations. This may eventually turn into large-scale armed conflicts involving many countries (Glen Hartmann et al., 2019).



Fig. Grey Zone Warfare

3.2 Issues

3.2.1 Complexity and ambiguity of hybrid threats

One of the basic things about hybrid threats is that those who undertake them know fully well that they are trying to become elusive. This reluctance to expose themselves even complicates counterstrategies. If we follow some of the models set up for countering hybrid warfare in East Asia by states or international organisations, this lack of 'self-disclosure' might throw a spanner in the works. For example, tracking cyber-attacks on shipping companies' data systems and gem thefts from commercial shipping channels may seem difficult. When there is no way to identify the attacker, this can have a huge impact on world trade altogether. This lack of clarity will slow down an efficient and timely response. It will complicate diplomatic efforts to find a solution.

3.2.2 Inadequate Legislation and Laws

The existing international legal frameworks stand ill-equipped to deal with the peculiar intricacies of hybrid warfare.

For example, when a run-of-the-mill conflict like cyber warfare is launched upon key maritime infrastructure, it plays itself into a massive mess—issues around the relevance and content of public international law vis-à-vis action taken here are still undecided. It becomes unclear whether one has committed an unlawful act in terms of international law or not when engaging in this kind of adventure from both aspects of general principles found in many jurisdictions if national fractions have the same principle.

3.2.3 Weaknesses in Technology

Modern digital technology, used by the maritime industry to navigate long distances or safely into deep harbors, can be hijacked by cyberwar. It is, therefore, a commonly used area of attack and vulnerability to such tactics, which we have observed. Yuwielding is the digital targeting of maritime infrastructure and operations logs, followed by virus attacks into computer systems, causing breakdowns at sea and logistical as well as financial losses.

3.2.4 Difficult Geopolitical Contexts

The combination of conventional and irregular forces often occurs within certain geographical areas where there are intricately unresolved geopolitical disputes. The South China Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Persian Gulf are all landlocked theatres of strategic import. Hybrid warfare strategies frequently exacerbate territorial disputes in these areas, vital strategic points have passed at significant crossroads, and

significant economic stakes are at risk. Many actors with differing interests obstructed collective security mechanisms as well, prompting further confrontations that, in turn, ran the risk of making a whole region unstable.

3.2.5 Economic Implications

Maritime domains are hit hard by hybrid threats because of their immense economic implications. Once main shipping routes are either closed or their important ports here suffer damage, much of this adds to the shipping costs, and resulting energy prices will likewise have an impact on goods from production for local markets to exports. Similarly, when there is such widespread or actual use of hybrid warfare approaches that afterwards, indemnity charges on the side effects are bound to shoot up sovereignty to shippers. Insurers thus raise premiums across the board, and maritime trade costs go up in general.

3.2.6 Enhancing Resilience and Facilitating Recovery

Improved resilience to hybrid threats involves not only reducing the likelihood of their occurrence but also developing rapid response capabilities. This requires financing replication of key infrastructure as well as staff training in recognition of such hybrids and the establishment of maritime rapid reaction teams. Resilience improvement should be based on an economic or strategic framework, depending on whether hybrid wars pose a significant danger.

In meeting these challenges, the world must take a comprehensive approach, including advanced technical safeguards, a more widely adopted global legal framework, better cooperation between maritime actors, and, whenever required, arrangements for crisis management. Sponsorship conducted in a manner that coordinates the global society as applications are implemented is the principal method of facing hybrid risks in marine and coastal environments.

Fig. Hybrid Warfare and Strategic Theory

3.3 Challenges

3.3.1 Detection and Monitoring

Difficulty detecting internal threats accompanied by external boats. It is tough for a submarine drone to hide its tracks in the water, and once it has performed all of its covertly effective damage, no apparent outwardness-proving traces remain on the sea floor. Furthermore, cyber-attacks can penetrate systems and become dormant. before they go active, disrupting maritime infrastructure protections (The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), 2018). As these events often occur in huge expanses of the ocean, it requires an enormous investment in resources and advanced technology to control

or trace them.

3.3.2 Collaboration across Agencies and Countries

This being the case, dealing effectively with hybrid threats calls for cooperation among different government ministries locally and also international allies between countries to make sure things are in a well-judged order. However, there may be obstacles in the form of different legal systems with different apparatuses and national mottos for working together (The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), 2018). Moreover, inadequate mechanisms or no means whatsoever to communicate effectively or integrate actions between navies, coast guards, the private sector, and international maritime organisations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) make solving the problem of hybrid threats difficult. Intelligence sharing between countries is essential to countering these menaces (The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), 2018). However, political considerations could restrict those sorts of gaps and slow the whole process.

3.3.3 Adjusting to Changing Strategies

This persistent problem emanates from hybrids' ability to change their tactics, which is constantly making it hard to solve since there are no set patterns to build on when dealing with cybercriminals. Currently, the cyber-security protections are updated, but tomorrow, they might not be relevant anymore as hackers produce new hacking techniques or discover vulnerabilities that were previously unknown. Warfare is made more complicated with the use of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Therefore, defensive strategies have to keep being researched and developed for newer offensive technologies. This also means that counterstrategies cannot remain static because they need to keep up with emerging weapons (The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), 2018).

3.3.4 Legal and ethical considerations

This is why dealing with the legal consequences of hybrid threats can be difficult (Michael, 2019). Hence, international law and norms must be considered in case of cyber-attacks or covert actions without any identifiable origin ("cyber-attacks" or "espionage operations"). Yet these criteria are not always clear-cut nor universally accepted. The absence of specificity in the law could hinder prompt action, thus allowing perpetrators to achieve their objectives without much accountability. Moreover, employing physical coercion in reaction to potentially trivial or ambiguous dangers has the potential to needlessly intensify disputes.

3.3.5 Allocation of Resources

However, the allocation of basic resources for effective counteracting of hybrid threats frequently places intolerable financial strain on national budgets. They tend to ignore certain other important security needs (Pangalos et al., 2020).
Upgrading their cyber defense mechanisms could prove too expensive for smaller governments, while the purchase of advanced surveillance equipment may also stretch them financially. Case in point: a state of alertness has long been maintained within countries such as those in Africa, which are heavily engaged in military hardware procurement projects of this kind; ongoing interposable tensions between states abound.

3.3.6 Training and Preparedness

Another significant problem is that sailors and coast guardsmen must be trained enough to be able to identify hybrid threats and then respond effectively. Within their strategies, hybrid warfare often goes against the limitations of normal military training paradigms. Therefore, one aspect of preparation is to continually conduct new rounds after rounds of full and comprehensive practice involving simulations of calls and police responses, as well as seminars on cybersecurity. It also involves interservice training for ultimate streamlining in this area. However, introducing and organizing these programs are resource

dependent.

3.3.7 Psychological and Information Warfare

The use of psychological elements in hybrid warfare, such as propaganda and disinformation, presents particular difficulties in maintaining public trust and morale. This method is often used by the enemy to break up the opposing force through intended confusion and indignation sown in both general populations (potential soldiers), thus complicating responses since it may very well be incumbent on a recipient of security measures in public places himself to refuse them.

This reveals that safeguarding the seas and coastlines requires an all-round eccentric approach that includes technologically advanced marine scientific research education; worldwide cooperation supported by flexible laws and regulations; comprehensive training programs for all sorts of foreseeable futures, including emergencies and preparedness at sea.



Fig. Countering Hybrid Warfare

4. Laws

4.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

Referred to as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS is a comprehensive body of laws covering areas such as maritime security, environmental regulations, and natural resource management in different parts of the ocean. Hybrid threats present in the sea include the most:

Territorial Waters and Innocent Passage
Territorial waters extend to 12 nautical miles from a state's coastal line, within which it enjoys full authority. Only under conditions of not posing a danger to the safety or security of the nation whose waters they transit may foreign ships pass through these security areas; acts such as smuggling or spying (which by their nature affect all lands being covered) carry with them the possible withdrawal any nation allowing such casements across borders may make.

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)

Beyond the territorial seas of a state, from the shore to 200 miles out, the state has exclusive rights to exploit marine resources. If you do not infringe on the rights and obligations of coastal states, third-party states can use military force within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Marine Space that is beyond EEZs Open Ocean is seas (or oceans) beyond Exclusive Economic Zones, where no nation has the power to exercise sovereignty over any part of it. But regardless of whether they are to be found on the shore or inland, all nations share similar entitlements to exploit the resources in such areas as these. The United

Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) forms a legal framework for carrying out freedom of navigation operations like this and is essential when dealing with hybrid threats in maritime spaces, i.e. making a discovery that your maritime 'territorial waters' have been seized by someone else, who cataracts onto national chokepoints, might then in turn force those attempting to get through into an undue headwind operation. Here, they are attempting this because they should be able to sell a set of fake maritime claims. This means that all States Parties to UNCLOS have the legal right to act in their EEZ.

4.2 The BTG Plan

The ISPS Code was formulated in the aftermath of 9/11, and it is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). The purpose of this was to establish a series of basic demands concerning security ships and port infrastructure. Its core principles:

Identification of Hazards

Careful detection of security risks and the effort to actively pursue preventive measures in order to prevent security incidents that disturb the commerce of a ship or facility involved in international trade. Important elements of it is:

Ship Security Plan (SSP)
All vessels must have a plan that is specifically government-approved and in which the security measures they have taken on board are delineated. The Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is an all-encompassing blueprint of the security measures and protocols at a port facility. Similar to SSPs, it also spells out what should be done at port facilities—in this instance, security measures in order to thwart illegal entry or the bringing in of bombs, explosives, and other dangerous substances. It is the foundation for everywhere we want to prevent outflows from piracy, terrorism, and other hybrid threats in sea areas.

4.3 The Vienna Convention on Cybercrime

This treaty was the first international effort to address Internet and computer-related crime by harmonizing national law enforcement measures, improving investigative methods, and promoting cooperation between countries. It pertains explicitly to crimes committed over the internet and other computer networks, including those involving deception, child exploitation, and protection of network defenses. In the context of marine security, this is a matter of considerable importance.

Mutual Assistance

One function of the Centre is to help countries gather and trade evidence in relation to the technological aspects of maritime cyber-attacks.
Real-time traffic data collection: This feature makes it possible to monitor suspicious activities that could portend the preparation of hybrid warfare operations.

4.4 The Tallinn Handbook on International Law Relevant to Cyber Warfare

There are different reasons why, although the Tallinn Manual is not binding international law, it probably produces the most thorough review yet to explain how world laws (mainly in times of peace but also when there is an armed conflict) apply to each thing we call “cyber.” The text explores such notions as state responsibility, sovereignty, and a government’s right to conduct cyber operations in retribution for hostile acts. This manual is equally important for countries designing their own strategies to combat cyberattacks in hybrid warfare settings targeting marine platforms.

4.5 The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) is an essential component of America’s maritime law system and is meant primarily to protect the nation’s ports and waterways from terrorist attacks. Notable

components include:

Area Maritime Security Plans

The maritime transportation industry must be protected from attack, which necessitates some kind of strategic thinking. In order to enter secure areas within maritime facilities, all persons need the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to have biometric credentials. These are the key legal frameworks of international law, and some countries confront dilemmas at sea where they work in a hybrid manner with those from their own domestic systems. Understanding these principles and applying them effectively will improve individual countries' security for their marine assets as they confront ever more contemporary forms of hybrid warfare.



Fig. Conceptual relationship of wars

5. Case Studies

5.1 The Maersk's Attack by Not Petya Malware in 2017

June 2017 witnessed the worst single global target Not Petya is known to have ever hit. It turned out to result in total disruption for Maersk, such that ports were closed at 76 locations around the world, and losses amounted to nearly 300 million dollars. This part of the so-called Ukrainian' conflict is often seen as Russian cyber attackers striking back at indirectly global supply chains. Also, it showed just how vulnerable the shipping industry is to cyber-attacks, with the result calling for stronger defenses against the exposure of items that would have been considered routine prior to this moment of real danger (16). Maersk took, as a result, comprehensive steps—and by all appearances, the whole industry followed suit generally--to rebuild their digital systems, strengthen cyber protection measures, and bring closer ties with national-level or international institutions responsible for cybersecurity. Hence, this case will definitely provide an example of the degree of cyber danger faced by the maritime industry and ways to reduce it (Njoroge, 2018).

5.2 Capture of Stena Impero by Iran in 2019

During mid-July 2019, at a time when deepening rifts between the West and Iran chiefly emerged from provocation on nuclear treaties plus some further binding international economic sanctions against our country were being accepted by other lesser ones in Europe, all indemnification under EU laws could be overridden if the prehistoric state were guilty enough or suffered enough indictments. New revolutionary Guard corpsmen boarded a Stena British-flagged ship, which was reported from satellite imagery as anchored southwards of Bandar Abbas port. It was also seen as a deterrent by conservatives opposed to Friday's election claims that President Mohammad Khatami might be re-doubling oil revenues and enjoying his own Eternal Return just weeks after the thirteenth time sent robes of office they had owed the 1969 Constitution. Saudi King Choudhury's fourth strategy erased the main opponent, two Marxists, and essential oil beneficiaries; they reappeared in the seventeenth. Many saw this stealth attack as a

counterfoil to Britain's capture of Iranian boats at Gibraltar earlier in the month, while others believed it to be politically motivated in view of its timing during negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (Barrett & Avery, p. 43). Hereafter, they used dynamic boarding tactics employing helicopters and speedboats to show ultimate control of the strait, demonstrating from the sea Iran's increasing influence upon it geopolitically (Hulen et al., 25). This further caused heightened global tension that necessitated added military protection for commerce in the area, resulting in the formation of the IMSC International Maritime Security Construct, which protects sea-going Persian Gulf activities.

5.3 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

A dangerous area for shipping is the Gulf of Guinea, where there is constant piracy, and this has a negative impact both on international trade routes and on regional stability. These pirates engage in activities that infringe national and international laws, such as ship piracy, abduction of people for ransom/information-gathering purposes, or even armed robbery. This poses a threat to human lives, which interferes with global commerce (Cheru & Obi, 2017). Different factors account for why this phenomenon is high, including varying levels of income among countries, self-help enforcement mechanisms about maritime laws, and low naval capability in these GCC states. Efforts to combat pirates include expanding naval patrols, cooperation between the countries, and security measures such as putting armed guards on ships.

At the same time, such as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, it promotes marine security collaboration and unites West and Central African states in any initiatives for cooperation. (Nzume et al., 2019) However, efforts are still being made on this front, although they have never yet borne fruit. Therefore, international collaboration and local governance structures that function well are necessary to lessen the risk of piracy. It is in these cases that they are likely to come up as threatening to maritime security and, at the same time, typical of what can be called hybrid threats: complex security issues jointly arising from geopolitics, technology, and economic crime.

Each case study gives different perspectives on how to manage them successfully, requiring, for example, greater technical resilience or efforts in international cooperation on criminal matters as well as local defense systems that merge.

As the Black Sea 2016 GPS spoofing event, Maersk's cyber-attack by Not Petya in 2017, Iran's capture of the British tanker Stena Impero in 2019and continuous piracy issues in the Gulf of Guinea illustrate, maritime security is susceptible to both hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare. This means maritime security is simultaneously a world of several variables. They show piracy issues that move along different maritime lines. It also demonstrates geopolitical games like sophisticated cyberattacks deployed in the name of international justice and the tradition of piracy as low as seducing small boat crews into turning rogue with big rewards coming eventually. In such an environment, how would one hope not to remain vulnerable? It is not just the strategies that pose these perils—they are also based upon orders of magnitude transcending any conceivable body politic. These problems have numerous implications for global commerce, worldwide shipping routes, and geopolitical balances of power. Such problems must be met creatively and, above all, consistently. However, the dangers that they pose also have another side thrust upon us: the world stage is an open one today. If we go down 2-3 percentage points in development levels because insurance costs rocket astronomically and through like things, it will be a burden on all nations. We will have lost time to address these difficulties again but will manage through other means since our lethargy in the face of such a visible emergency eventually gave way to fully apparent problems defiant of any kind of policy initiative.

References

1. Hoffman, F.G., "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
2. McCuen, J. "Hybrid Wars." Military Review, March-April 2008.
3. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. "Hybrid Threats: A Strategic Communications Perspective." 2015.
4. Arquilla, J., and Ronfeldt, D. "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy." Corporation, 2001.
5. Jaitner, M. "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges." Small Wars Journal, 2014.
6. Lasconjarias, G., and Larsen, J. A., "NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats." NATO Defence College, 2015.
7. Bartles, C. "Getting Gerasimov Right." Military Review, January-February 2016.
8. Kilcullen, D. "Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla." Oxford University Press, 2013.
9. Mattis, J., and Hoffman, F.G. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." Proceedings of the Naval Institute, November 2005.
10. Mumford, A. "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict." The RUSI Journal, 2013.
11. Renz, B., and Smith, H. (eds.). "Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Going Beyond the Label." Aleksanteri Institute, 2016.
12. Giles, K. "Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power." Chatham House, 2016.
13. Thornton, R. "Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century." Polity, 2007.
14. Tuck, C., and Kennedy, M. "The Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition." Ethics & International Affairs, 2015.
15. Mazarr, "Mastering the Grey Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict." Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2015.
16. Friedman, G. "The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century." Anchor Books, 2010.
17. Adamsky, D. "Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy." Proliferation Papers, IFRI, 2015.
18. Lindsay, J.R. "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare." Security Studies, 2013.
19. United Nations. "Review of Maritime Transport." UNCTAD, Annual Report.
20. Greenberg, A. "Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers." Doubleday, 2019.
21. Brantly, A.F., "The Cyber Dimension of Modern Hybrid Warfare and its Relevance for NATO." NATO Defence College, 2016.
22. Bunker, R.J., and Sullivan, J.P., "Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC)." Small Wars Journal, 2020.
23. Geis, P., and Holt, B. "Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory." Hoover Institution Press, 2009.
24. Valeriano, B., and Maness, R. "Cyber War Versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System." Oxford University Press, 2015.
25. Shearer, A., et al., "Underwater Warfare: An Evolving Threat to Maritime Security." International Security, 2018.
26. Wilkinson, P. "Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response." Routledge, 2011.
27. Jensen, B. "The Maritime Strategy of Smaller Naval Powers." Naval War College Review, 2019.
28. Farley, R. "The Future of Undersea Competition." Comparative Strategy, 2020.
29. Zakem, V., et al., "Strategic Culture and Ways of War." CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2016.
30. Fidler, D.P. "The Snowden Reader." Indiana University Press, 2015.
31. Simón, L. "Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy, and European Security." Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
32. Murray, W., and Mansoor, P.R. (eds.). "Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex"
Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present." Cambridge University Press, 2012.
33. Grant, R. "The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union." Basic Books, 2007.

34. Libicki, M.C. "Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar." RAND Corporation, 2009.
35. Robinson, L., et al., "Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses." RAND Corporation, 2018.
36. Khurana, G.S. "Maritime Forces in Pursuit of National Security." National Maritime Foundation, 2018.
37. International Maritime Bureau. "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2019." ICC Commercial Crime Services, 2020.
38. Pham, J. P. "Pirates, Terrorists, and Warlords: The History, Influence, and Future of Armed Groups Around the World." Skyhorse Publishing, 2009.
39. Inkster, N. "The Great Decoupling: China, America, and the Struggle for Technological Supremacy." Hurst Publishers, 2020.
40. Woodward, S. "Cybersecurity for National Defence: Challenges and Opportunities for National Security." Praeger Security International, 2020.
41. Gartzke, E. "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth." University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
42. Walt, S.M., "The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy." Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018.
Here are brief references numbered 43 to 52 for your research paper:
43. Hoffman, F. G. (2007). "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
44. Mumford, A. (2013). "Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict." The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40-46.
45. Galeotti, M. (2016). "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War." Military Review, 96(4), 36-39.
46. Freedman, L. (2017). "The Future of War: History." PublicAffairs.
47. Till, G. (2018). "Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century." 4th ed. Routledge.
48. Haddick, R. (2014). "Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific." Naval Institute Press.
49. Patalano, A. (2021). "Hybrid Warfare at Sea: The Strategic Culture of the Russian Navy." Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(3), 421-447.
50. Mahnken, T. G., & Babbage, R. (2021). "Countering Comprehensive Coercion: Competitive Strategies Against Authoritarian Political Warfare." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
51. Hybrid CoE (2019). "Hybrid Threats: A Strategic Communications Perspective." The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.
52. Schreier, F. (2018). "On the Hybrid Nature of War and Conflicts." DCAF Paper, 18.